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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1812, Georgia became the first state to provide for the popular elec-
tion of its judiciary.1 Since then, Georgia, like many other states, has been in-
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
B.A, 1996, Amherst College; J.D. 2001, University of Michigan; Ph.D. 2004, University of
Michigan.
I See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Georgia, at
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volved in an effort to reconcile two very different ideals in its judicial system:
accountability to the public and impartiality. Impartiality, which is the principle
that judges should treat litigants in an equal and unbiased manner, is of funda-
mental importance in a constitutional form of government.2 However, since the
Nineteenth Century, Americans have tried to maintain the impartiality of the
judiciary while at the same time adapting the institution to accord with the view
that judges should understand and be responsive to the values and desires of the
citizens in their communities.
3
This Article will argue that, in spite of the best efforts of many over the
years, attempts to reconcile judicial accountability with impartiality have not
succeeded. It will also argue that these efforts are doomed to failure because of
the impossibility of creating a system in which judges remain impartial, but are
given an incentive to cultivate the good will of others in order to keep their jobs.
Although elections are not the only means used to select and reselect judges,4
this Article will focus primarily on the effects of elections on judicial impartial-
ity. This is because elections are the most widely used form of judicial selection
and reselection,5 and because most of the research on the effects of public opin-
ion on judicial decision making involves courts that are subject to elections.
Part II focuses on the controversy surrounding elections as a means of
judicial selection and retention. Part III presents the results of various studies
which indicate that electoral considerations can compromise the impartiality of
some judges, while Part IV advances the thesis that impartiality is a more impor-
tant attribute than accountability to the judiciary. Part V evaluates various re-
forms that have been proposed to diminish the threat that elections pose to judi-
cial impartiality, and Part VI presents an argument as to why none of these re-
forms can effectively reconcile accountability with impartiality within the judi-
ciary. Finally, Part VII advocates the elimination of judicial elections and all
other forms ofjudicial reselection as the only means of removing the threat that
reselection poses to the judiciary's reputation for impartiality. This section also
suggests alternatives to judicial reselection, including appointment of judges for
life, or for a single, lengthy term, that would better insure the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary both in appearance and in fact.
http://www.ajs.org/js/GA history.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
2 See Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116
HARv. L. REv. 16, 54-60 (2002).
3 See Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: The
Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31, 34-35 (1986).
4 Other methods include legislative appointment, gubernatorial appointment, and merit selec-
tion through a nominating commission. See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in
the States: Appellate and General Jurisdiction Courts 3 (Jan., 2004), available at
http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts-old.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
5 See id. at 3-12. Thirty-nine states use some form of elections (partisan, non-partisan, or
retention) to select or retain their judiciary at some level. Id.
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II. ELECTIONS - A POPULAR AND CONTROVERSIAL MEANS OF
SELECTING AND RETAINING JUDGES
Today, nearly all states have built some form of tenure review into their
judicial systems as a routinized means of holding judges accountable for their
decisions. 6 A distinction is made here between "routinized" means of holding
judges accountable, such as elections, and "extraordinary" means of holding
them accountable, such as impeachment and removal, which are usually re-
served for incidents of ethical or criminal misconduct.7  Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island stand out as the only states that do not force their
judges to submit to any form of reselection.8 Furthermore, among those states
that use some form of judicial tenure review, there can be no doubt about the
popularity of elections as a means of selecting judges and deciding whether they
should remain in office. Today, all but eleven states9 and the District of Colum-
bia use elections in either the selection or retention process. 10 However, despite
the fact that most of the states have tried to build accountability into their judi-
cial systems by using elections, there is no consensus about which election sys-
tem best protects judicial impartiality. For example, today there are three dis-
tinct election based systems for selecting and retaining judges: partisan elec-
tions, in which judicial candidates appear on the ballot with their political party
affiliations; non-partisan elections, in which judicial candidates appear without
party affiliations; and retention elections, in which judges appear without their
party affiliations and in which citizens vote yes or no about whether a judge
should remain in office for another term.11 Partisan elections represent the old-
est form of judicial elections. 12 However, many states have turned away from
them over the last century, in favor of non-partisan elections and retention elec-
tions, in part, as a way of protecting the judiciary's reputation for fairness from
the deleterious effects of having judges openly associated with political parties
and their policy positions.' 3 Still, complaints persist that judicial candidates'
need to raise money to fund their election campaigns compromises their ability
6 See id.
7 See, e.g., Clifford J. Wallace, Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving Judicial
Independence: Comparative Perspectives, 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 341, 348-50 (1998).
8 See American Judicature Society, supra note 4, at 4-12.
9 The eleven states are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. See id.
10 See id.
I I See Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best " Method, 23
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 16-38 (1995).
12 See id. at 17.
13 See id. at 24-25.
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to fairly decide the cases before them and lower the public's confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary. 14 Critics of judicial elections have also pointed out
that the electorate in these contests is often uninformed, 15 and that judicial can-
didates sometimes make statements or engage in political activities that com-
promise their reputation for impartiality.'
6
Despite the fact that there are complaints about the negative effects of
judicial elections on the judiciary, the following question must be asked: what
evidence exists to support these allegations? A simple way to answer this ques-
tion would be to say that anything that causes people to doubt the fundamental
fairness of the judiciary is a threat to the institution's political legitimacy and to
the authority of its decisions, and that because elections raise such doubts, they
should be eliminated from the judicial selection and reselection process. How-
ever, this answer is insufficient because it does not take seriously the responsi-
bility of those who call for a fundamental change in one of society's most im-
portant institutions to present evidence to support their claim that the institution
is flawed and to suggest ways to correct the problem.
Anecdotal evidence about isolated incidents of suspicious behavior by
certain judges or courts can always be dismissed as unrepresentative of a larger
pattern of biased behavior on the part of the judges or courts implicated. More
persuasive evidence about the possible influence of electoral considerations on
judges' decision making can come from studies that survey several courts, many
judges, and a large number of cases. The results of such studies, especially
those that are designed to control for effects of other variables that could be con-
founded with the effects of electoral stimuli, are more persuasive than anecdotal
evidence because they cannot be as easily dismissed as aberrational.
Ill. STUDIES OF ELECTED JUDGES' DECISIONAL PROPENSITIES
A. The Effect of Constituent Opinion
Evidence supporting the conclusion that judges' behavior on the bench
is influenced by factors relevant to their electoral fortunes has been mounting
over the last two decades. For example, in a case study of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court, Melinda Gann Hall tested her hypothesis that appellate judges who
14 See, e.g, Kara Baker, Is Justice for Sale in Ohio? An Examination of Ohio Judicial Elections
and Suggestions for Reform Focusing on the 2000 Race for the Ohio Supreme Court, 35 AKRON
L. REV. 159, 182-83 (2001); John D. Fabian, Note, The Paradox of Elected Judges: Tension in the
American Judicial System, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 155-56 (2001); Thomas R. Phillips,
When Money Talks, the Judiciary Must Balk, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 14, 2002, at B2.
15 See, e.g., SARA MATHIAS, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, ELECTING JUSTICE: A
HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 17-18 (1990).
16 Seeid at 31-33, 40-42.
17 See id. at 17, 31, 43, 47.
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wish to quell public criticism of their rulings will tend to dissent from majority
opinions less frequently than those who are not as concerned about public opin-
ion.18 Hall based this supposition on the fact that dissenting opinions tend to
distinguish their authors from the rest of the court, and might be less easily de-
fensible in the eyes of the public, given that they failed to garner the support of a
majority of the court.19 In a series of in-depth interviews with the members of
Louisiana's high court, Hall found that a justice who described himself as a lib-
eral because he tended to favor the defense in criminal appeals more often than
the rest of the court, said that he frequently sided with the majority in death pen-
alty appeals (whether for or against the defendant) in an effort to blunt potentialS 20
criticism that he was too soft on criminals when his term expired. In the inter-
views, this judge stated that retaining his office was his primary motivation for
engaging in this strategy, and that in doing so he sometimes let political consid-
erations outweigh his honest assessment of the merits of the case.2 1 He ex-
plained his decision to limit his dissents in death penalty cases by specifically
citing the amount of publicity that these high profile decisions were likely to
receive in the state's newspapers and in potential opponents' campaigns against
him.22 He was also very much aware of the fact that his general opposition to
the death penalty put him at odds with the views of most of his constituents.2
3
The fact that he was engaging in this strategy because he feared being out of
step with his electorate is highlighted by the fact that two other justices on the
same court who did not as frequently side with criminal defendants in non-
capital cases, and who did not express as much anxiety about their chances of
being reelected, dissented more often in capital cases than the justice who feared
for his seat.
24
In a landmark empirical study following up on the evidence from Lou-
isiana, Hall tested the hypothesis that elected judges respond to what they per-
ceive to be their constituents' policy preferences by examining the voting pat-
terns of the justices of the following courts of last resort in criminal appeals:
Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, and of the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
Is Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence In State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and
a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117, 1119 (1987).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1119-22. Hall's study of the Louisiana justices' votes in criminal appeals found that
this justice was the most likely of all of the justices on the court to favor the accused in criminal
appeals. Id. at 1121.
21 Id. at 1120.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1121-23.
2005]
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peals. 25 Specifically, Hall wished to discover whether there was evidence that
the "liberal" justices of other supreme courts were mimicking the defensive be-
havior of the Louisiana justice who sought to blunt charges that he was "soft" on
criminals by avoiding dissents in capital punishment cases.26 The study was
further facilitated by the fact that public opinion polls in all of these states indi-
cated that their citizens strongly supported the death penalty, which, in turn,
suggested that the justices who supported the accused in such cases were acting
contrary to the wishes of their constituents.
27
Hall then identified ten "liberal" justices whose voting records indicated
that they supported the defense more often than their colleagues in criminal ap-
peals. 28 Her findings confirmed her hypothesis that liberal justices in states
where the death penalty is popular often seek to protect themselves from politi-
cal criticism by siding with the majority in death penalty cases. 29 However, she
also found that the liberal justices' sensitivity to the political consequences of
their votes was greater if those justices were elected from districts as opposed to
statewide, if they had held elected office previously, or if they faced another
election within two years or less.30 Hall also discovered that liberal justices who
won their last elections by smaller margins and justices who had experience
seeking reelection were more likely to vote with the conservative majority in
death penalty cases than were justices who had won by larger margins, or who
had not yet sought reelection to the court.
31
These findings about the sensitivity of judges to matters affecting their
reelection were confirmed in a larger study published three years later by Hall
and Paul Brace. 32 This study looked at supreme court justices from California,
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas,
and included variables to control for the influence of important state legislation,
case facts, and the political environment in the state.33 The results indicated that
elected justices from states with contested elections were significantly more
25 Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J.
POL. 427, 433 (1992). Note that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is the court of last resort for
criminal cases in Texas. See id. The Texas Supreme Court serves this function for all other types
of cases. See TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. V, § 3, cl. a.
26 See Hall, supra note 25, at 427-28.
27 ld. at 435.
28 Id. at 433-36.
29 Id. at 438-40.
30 Id. at 438-42.
31 Id. at 439.
32 See Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the
American States, 48 POL. R-Es. Q. 5 (1995).
33 Id. at 13-24.
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likely than those from states with retention elections (or without elections) to
favor the state in death penalty appeals.34 A later study of the California Su-
preme Court's justices showed that some of them displayed the same sort of
responsiveness to public opinion about the death penalty, and, more specifically,
to active targeting by political opposition.
35
B. The Effect of Campaign Contributions
However, the empirical evidence suggesting the influence of electoral
considerations on judges' decisions is not limited to studies of how the political
environment shapes judges' decisional propensities. Empirical evidence also
exists indicating that the need to raise funds for elections might also be influenc-
ing some judges as they decide the cases before them.36 Given that running for
office is a costly proposition for judges,37 and that judges see the ability to raise
money as vitally important to their election prospects, 38 it is logical to assume
that judges might reward those who contribute to them with favorable rulings,
and punish those who do not contribute to them with unfavorable rulings in an
effort to make sure that their campaign coffers will be full at the next election.
Accordingly, many judges, scholars, journalists, and others have commented on
the possibly deleterious implications of campaign contributions for judicial in-
dependence and impartiality.
39
34 Ird. at 21-25.
35 See Carol Ann Traut & Craig F. Emmert, Expanding the Integrated Model of Judicial Deci-
sion Making: The California Justices and Capital Punishment, 60 J. POL. 1166, 1177 (1998).
36 See, e.g., Madhavi McCall, Buying Justice in Texas: The Influence of Campaign Contribu-
tions on the Voting Behavior of Texas Supreme Court Justices, 22 AM. REV. POL. 349, 359-67
(2001); Eric Waltenburg & Charles Lopeman, Tort Decisions and Campaign Dollars, 28 SE. POL.
REV. 241, 250-58 (2000); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study
ofArbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583 (2002); TEXANS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, PAY
TO PLAY: How BIG MONEY Buys ACCESS TO THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT (Apr. 2001), available
at http://www.tpj.org/docs/2001/04/reports/paytoplay; Aman L. McLeod, An Excess of Participa-
tion: A Critical Examination of Judicial Elections and their Consequences for American Democ-
racy (June 8, 2004) (unpublished dissertation on file with the University of Michigan).
37 See, e.g., Kyle Cheek & Anthony Champagne, Money in Texas Supreme Court Elections
1980-1998, 84 JUDICATURE 20, 22 (2000); Philip L. DuBois, Voting Cues in NonPartisan Trial
Court Elections: A Multivariate Assessment, 18 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 395, 405-07 (1984); Stuart
Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40
STAN. L. REV. 449, 449-50 (1988); Chris W. Bonneau, Understanding the Dynamics of Campaign
Spending in State Supreme Court Elections (Apr. 3, 2003) (unpublished article on file with au-
thor).
38 See, e.g., Banner, supra note 37, at 455-5 8; Stephanie Hanes, Baltimore County Judges Get
Aggressive In Election: But Some Lawyers Call Their Fund-Raising Tactics Extreme for Bench
Seats, BALT. SUN, Apr. 13, 2003, at IB; Frontline: Justice for Sale (PBS television broadcast,
Nov. 23, 1999).
39 See, e.g., James J. Alfini & Terrance J. Brooks, Ethical Constraints on Judicial Election
2005]
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Several studies have focused directly on the effect of campaign contri-
butions on judicial decision-making. For example, Texans for Public Justice
("TPJ") released a study of the petitions for review filed with the Texas Su-
preme Court between 1994 and 1998.40 The TPJ found that the court4 1 was four
times more likely to accept a petition filed by a party,42 attorney, or law firm
that had contributed money to one or more of the justices who stood for election
at some point during the period in question than if the petition was filed by an
entity that had not made any contributions. 43 The TPJ study also revealed that
justices who faced an election during the period under study relied heavily on
contributions from parties, attorneys, and law firms, with fifty-two Uercent of
the contributions that the justices received coming from these sources, and that
the probability that a petition would be accepted increased as the amount con-
tributed to the court increased. 45 For example, TPJ found that on average, a
petitioner who gave the court $100,000 over the period was seven-and-a-half
times more likely to have a petition accepted than was a petitioner who did not
contribute during the period, 46 and that, on average, petitions from those who
gave $250,000 or more, were ten times more likely to be accepted than were
petitions from those who did not contribute.4 7
Another study, conducted by Stephen Ware, looked at the effects of the
campaign contributions on the rulings of the Alabama Supreme Court in cases
regarding the validity and scope of arbitration clauses in contracts.4 8  Ware
Campaigns: A Review and Critique of Canon 7, 77 KY. L.J. 671 (1989); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judi-
cial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 133 (1998); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty:
Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. Crit. L. REv. 689 (1995).
40 See TEXANS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, supra note 36. Only those petitions that were filed by one
party in the case were included in the study. Id. at 4. Cases in which both sides petitioned for
appeal were excluded. Id.
41 The Texas Supreme Court has nine justices, and requires at least four justices to vote in
favor of granting the petition in order for the Court to decide the case. Id. at 5. The justices' votes
and their deliberations about the petitions are strictly confidential, and the justices are not required
explain why they granted or rejected a given petition. Id.
42 The only parties included in this study were those that were "institutional entities," like
corporations and foundations, or individuals and groups affiliated with entities, such as employees
of the corporation or political action committees founded or supported by the corporation. id. at 4.
43 Id. at 8-9.
44 On an individual level, the percentage of total contributions from parties, law firms, and
lawyers ranged from a high of sixty percent for one justice, to a low of forty-three percent for
another. Id. at 7.
45 Id. at 10-16.
46 Id. at 10.
47 Id.
48 Ware, supra note 36, at 583.
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found that there was a nearly perfect correlation between a justice having sup-
ported or opposed arbitration clauses, and whether that justice received cam-
paign funds from businesses or from trial lawyers.49 Ware studied these cases
and these contributors because trial lawyers almost always support candidates
who are sympathetic to the interests of plaintiffs (primarily in tort actions),
while businesses and their lobbying groups regularly support candidates who are
sympathetic to the interests of defendants.5 0 In nearly every case, justices who
derived support from businesses voted to uphold the arbitration clauses at issue
in the case, while those justices who received money from trial lawyers almost
always voted to invalidate such clauses.
5 1
Ware noted, however, that his study could not demonstrate a causal link
between the Alabama justices' voting patterns and the source of their contribu-
tions, because it did not control for a number of factors that might influence the
justices' decisions in a given case.52 Other studies of the effect that contribu-
tions have on judges' voting habits by Waltenburg and Lopeman, McCall, and
the author53 have been more rigorous, in that they have included control vari-
ables that allow researchers to better isolate the effect of campaign contributions
on the justices' voting proclivities.
For example, using a more sophisticated model, Waltenburg and Lope-
man studied decisions in tort cases from the supreme courts of Alabama, Ken-
tucky, and Ohio, and found that pro-plaintiff contributions from attorneys and a
justice's partisan affiliation were significant predictors of a pro-plaintiff vote.54
Later, Madhavi McCall conducted an even more detailed study of the effects of
contributions on judicial decisions.5 5 Looking at a group of cases decided by
the Texas Supreme Court between 1994 and 1997, she found that conservative
justices (i.e., justices whom one would not expect to favor plaintiffs in the cases
that she chose), were more likely to favor plaintiffs with their votes in cases
49 Id. at 627.
50 Id. at 596-600.
Sl Id. at 617. Businesses tend to favor arbitration as a means of dispute resolution in a number
of situations because it is cheaper and faster than formal litigation. See Steven J. Ware, Arbitra-
tion Under Assault: Trial Lawyers Lead the Charge, POLIcy ANALYSIS No. 433 (Apr. 18, 2002),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa433.pdf. Trial lawyers generally oppose arbitration,
they say, because the rules of evidence, discovery and procedure that are used in most arbitration
cases disadvantage their clients, who are generally consumers. See, e.g., Alabama Trial Lawyers
Association, Why Consumers Should Be Concerned About Arbitration, at
http://www.atla.netiarbitration.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004). Furthermore, they claim, arbitra-
tors do not have to adhere to ethics rules, and arbitration clauses are usually written so as to pro-
hibit review of the arbitrator's decision by a court. See id.
52 See Ware, supra note 36, at 601.
53 See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
54 Waltenburg & Lopeman, supra note 36, at 250-58.
55 McCall, supra note 36, at 359-70.
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concerning procedural issues if these plaintiffs or their lawyers had made con-
tributions to those justices during the most recent election cycle. 56
A study conducted by the author on the effects of campaign contribu-
tions focused solely on the contributions of the firms who represented clients in
certain types of civil cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court.57 The re-
suits of the study indicated that, after controlling for the effects of party affilia-
tion, the experience of the firms who argued the case, and other theoretically
significant variables, firms contributing more than their rivals to a justice in that
justice's last campaign had a greater chance of winning that justice's vote than
did the firms that were "out-contributed" in cases having to do with the legality58
of acts of the state government or of a local government. For example, this
study revealed that in cases involving government regulation (i.e. environmental
regulations, zoning, taxation, etc.), on average, the probability that a Democratic
justice would favor the government's position in these cases rose by approxi-
mately seventeen percent when the firms favoring the government's position
had a five thousand dollar contribution advantage over their opponents than
when both sides had contributed the same amount. 59 On the other hand, the
probability that a Republican justice would favor the government's position
under the same circumstances, on average, rose by approximately twenty-eight
60percent. If the firms opposing the government's position in the case had a five
thousand dollar contribution advantage, a Democratic justice was, on average,
approximately six percent less likely to vote for the government's position than
if both sides had contributed the same amount.61 In the same circumstances, a
Republican justice was, on average, approximately fourteen percent less likely
to favor the government's position.
62
Although the evidence is not yet conclusive,63 these studies suggest that
perceptions of public opinion and contributions can affect judges' decision mak-
ing. However, a simple recitation of the results of studies indicating that at least
some judges' decisions are influenced by campaign contributions and constitu-
56 Id. at 359-67.
57 McLeod, supra note 36, at 43-76.
58 Id. at 61-70.
59 Id. at 69 tbl. 9.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 For example, in their study of the voting behavior of the justices of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, Ditslear and Williams failed to find any link between the contributions of attorneys who
had cases decided by the court, and the judges voting proclivities. Corey A. Ditslear and Margaret
S. Williams, Bidding for Justice: The Influence of Contributions on State Supreme Courts 13-23
(Aug. 30, 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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ent opinion does not constitute an argument as to why these influences on the
judiciary are undesirable. The next section will put forward an argument about
why judicial impartiality is more important than judicial accountability, and
about why the two attributes might not be able to co-exist comfortably within
the same institution.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
As in the Nineteenth Century, many still argue today that judges' deci-
sions should be influenced by electoral considerations. 64 For example, West
Virginia Supreme Court Justice Larry V. Starcher claims that elections are bene-
ficial because they result in a judiciary that is more accountable, independent,
and legitimate than those selected in other systems. 65 However, this argument
discounts the critical importance of impartiality, both in appearance and in fact,
to the judiciary's ability to function effectively. Starcher apparently does not
see the damage that is done to the judiciary's moral and political authority when
the public becomes convinced that the outcome of a case is influenced by the
judge's desire to stay on the bench. If the lack of confidence in the judiciary
becomes severe, it could lead people to shun courts as fora for resolving dis-
putes, and generally weaken respect for law.66 Also, the fact that such damage
might be occurring is not simply conjectural. For example, in a recent poll by
the American Bar Association, seventy-two percent of respondents indicated
that they were at least somewhat concerned that having to raise money might
compromise judges' impartiality.67 Also, a national survey by the Justice at
Stake Campaign found that seventy-six percent of the voters believed that con-
tributions exert at least some influence on the judges who receive them.
68
64 See, e.g., Michael DeBow et al., The Federalist Society, The Case for Partisan Judicial
Elections, Judicial Selection White Papers, at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/White%20
Papers/judicialelection.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004); Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial:
State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary 1846-1860, 45 THE HIsToRIAN
337 (1983); Larry V. Starcher, Choosing West Virginia's Judges, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 767
(2001).
65 See Starcher, supra note 64, at 769-70.
66 See Baker, supra note 14, at 173-74.
67 Press Release, American Bar Association, Poll: Confidence in Judiciary Eroded by Judges'
Need to Raise Campaign Money (Aug. 12, 2002) [hereinafter A.B.A. Poll], available at
http://www.abanet.org/media/aug02/apnewsconfrevised8-8.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
68 See GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH, INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, JUSTICE
AT STAKE-STATE JUDGE FREQUENCY QUESTIONAIRE 5 (Oct. 30 to Nov. 7, 2002), available at
http://faircourts.org/files/JASNationalSurvcyResults.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2005). But see
A.B.A. Poll, supra note 70 (reporting that a majority of respondents indicated that they were more
likely to trust elected judges than non-elected judges).
2005]
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss2/7
WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW
Judicial impartiality is an indispensable feature of constitutional gov-
emnment. 69 However, judicial elections and other forms of reselection compro-
mise judicial impartiality in appearance and in fact, by giving judges an incen-
tive when deciding a case to grant excessive weight to the opinions of the public,
their campaign contributors, and others whom they believe to be influential in
their reselection efforts.
The maintenance of this impartiality does not require judges to com-
pletely ignore the policy preferences of their communities when deciding the
cases before them. Indeed, consideration of a community's traditions and policy
preferences is a well-established tool that judges use to help them interpret and
apply the law, and can greatly improve the quality and relevance of their deci-
sions. 70 However, thinking about whether an interpretation of a legal provision
is in keeping with a community's traditions and favored policies is different
from judges handing down decisions that are contrary to their honest assessment
of the law and the facts out of fear that the decision will leave them electorally
vulnerable, or will anger those who can keep them on the bench.
A thoughtful consideration of a community's traditions, attitudes and
policy choices, and of how these reflect on a given issue before the court re-
quires meditation, scholarly reflection, and a balanced consideration of a com-
munity's history. 7 1 However, the shorter the time interval before the expiration
of a judge's term, the more likely a judge is to give excessive weight to present
public opinion, or to the opinion of the loudest or most influential voices in a
community, which might be only temporarily inflamed by some issue. 72 On the
other hand, a judge who never has to face reelection, or one who has to face it in
several years, has far less incentive to excessively weight current public opinion
or the opinions of those who can remove him/her. 73 The fear of removal from
69 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
70 For examples of the U.S. Supreme Court using the prevalence of a policy among the states
and in U.S. legal history, and changes in those policies to justify its decisions, see Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568-73 (2003); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-73 (1989); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-82 (1976); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-58 (1968).
71 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-73.
72 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 18, at 439-44.; McCall, supra note 36, at 364.
73 See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian
Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
87, 96-98 (1993) (arguing that there is, on average, a five year lag between shifts in public opinion
on a given issue and shifts in Supreme Court decisions on the same issue); Helmut Norpoth et al.,
Popular Influence of Supreme Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 711, 716 (1994) (arguing
that there are very long lags between shifts in pubic opinion on an issue and corresponding shifts
in Supreme Court decisions). But see Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the
Supreme Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL.
SCi. 468, 493 (1997); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal
Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. OF POL. 169,
195 (1996) (arguing that individual justices of the Supreme Court, as opposed to the majority of
the Court, respond more quickly to shifts in public opinion on a given issue).
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office might also cause a judge to make a decision that ignores the community's
long standing values, or that is poorly reasoned, or that sets poor public policy,
in order to avoid being punished for a decision that opposes momentary popular
opinion. In the worst case scenarios, as studies by Hall
74 and Brace and Hall75
indicate, fear of removal might cause judges to condemn a person to death de-
spite their honest view as to the legally correct outcome of the case.
The perceived importance of money to winning judicial elections can
have a similarly corrosive effect on judicial impartiality. 76 Those with great
wealth will almost always enjoy an advantage over the poor in terms of influ-
encing the world around them to serve their ends. Their financial influence can
be exercised in the political process through campaign contributions to legisla-
tive or executive officials to manipulate the content of the law, or in the courts
through their ability to hire experienced and politically active firms, or to afford
expert witnesses and consultants to aid in litigation. However, if a judge is fair,
independent, and free of the influence of campaign contributions or other con-
siderations regarding job retention, there might be a greater chance the judge
will see through an elaborate and expensive legal presentation if the underlying
case is legally weak to rule in favor of a poor litigant who has the law on her
side. But a poor litigant's chances of victory might be reduced, despite the
strength of her claims, if that litigant has not contributed to the judge who hears
her case, or cannot obtain the services of a firm that has made contributions.
Thus, hiring an expensive firm to argue a case or contributing to influence a
legislator to change a law is different in principle from paying off the judges
who preside over the nation's courts. As stated earlier, one of the ideals held
forth to all citizens in our society is that all who come before the courts will
stand as equals, which implies that receiving a fair hearing in court should not
depend on having a significant financial involvement in judicial politics, or on
being represented by a law firm that does. Judicial elections, by giving judges
an incentive to raise money, and, therefore, to ingratiate themselves to contribu-
tors, undermine this ideal. Most disturbingly, the aforementioned recent studies
by Waltenberg and Lopeman, McCall, and the author suggest that some judges
might be acting on this strong incentive to please their contributors.
77
V. JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORM
Given the negative impact that judicial elections and contributions ap-
pear to have on the functioning of the judiciary, what are the prospects for suc-
cessfully reforming judicial elections so as to reduce their deleterious effects on
74 See Hall, supra notes 18, 25.
75 See Brace & Hall, supra note 32.
76 See supra Part III.B.
77 See id.
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judicial impartiality? The following sections will describe the host of reforms
that have been proposed over the years to limit the damaging effect elections
have had on the judiciary, and explain why none of them have succeeded or are
likely to succeed in quieting concerns about elections due to the fundamental
difficulty of creating a judicial system in which judges are simultaneously im-
partial and accountable for the decisions they make.
A. Merit Selection and Retention
In recognition of what is perceived to be the infeasibility of abolishing
judicial elections, those who have concerns about electing judges have focused
on encouraging reforms of the election process. Some, like the American Judi-
cature Society ("AJS"), have lobbied hard for the abolition of contested elec-
tions in favor of a system combining so called "merit" selection and retention
elections.
78
Specifically, the AJS argues that merit selection with retention elections
is a better system for selecting and retaining judges than contested elections in
several ways. First, the AJS claims that in contested elections (both partisan and
non-partisan), judicial candidates often receive a party's endorsement as a re-
ward for faithful support and fundraising rather than for professional experience
or character. 79 Second, the AJS points out that judicial elections rarely offer
voters an opportunity to make an informed choice among the candidates given
the low profile of most judicial races and the presence of ethics rules that inhibit
the candidates' ability to directly discuss issues that might be of great concern to
the voters.8° Third, the AJS calls attention to the possibility that the need to
collect campaign contributions in contested elections might compromise the
independence and impartiality of the judges who receive the money. 81 Finally,
according to the AJS, the merit selection and retention alternative ensures that
professional, as opposed to political, qualifications play the paramount role in
deciding which candidates reach the bench.82 The AJS also claims that merit
selection and retention eliminates any potential bias caused by campaign contri-
78 See American Judicature Society, Merit Selection: The Best Way to Choose the Best Judges,
at http://www.ajs.org/selectionfms-descrip.pdf (last visited June 28, 2003).
79 Id. at 1-2.
so Id. at 1. The validity of this criticism has been called into question, however, by the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), in which
the Court struck down ethics rules that limit judicial candidates' freedom to announce their views
about disputed legal or political issues during campaigns. See id at 788.
81 See American Judicature Society, supra note 78, at 2.
82 Id. at 1-2.
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butions, while simultaneously preserving the public's ability to hold judges ac-
countable for their decisions.
There is not much evidence, however, to prove that merit selection and
retention systems actually produce the benefits that the AJS claims. For exam-
ple, studies in states that use merit selection and retention elections indicate that
political considerations are usually just as important in these systems as they are
in systems that use contested elections. 84 This is primarily because the selection
commissions that compile the lists of candidates from whom a governor must
choose are themselves usually highly partisan in terms of their composition and
deliberations.
85
Furthermore, while it is no doubt true, as the AJS claims, that merit se-
lection allows the public to hold judges accountable by removing them from
office, AJS apparently fails to consider that the mere possibility of removal it-
self might impact judges' decisions by forcing them to account for the potential
electoral opposition that might be generated by a given decision. There have
been a number of high profile instances in which judges were not retained fol-
lowing vitriolic political campaigns against them, all of which capitalized on
public outrage at a handful of these judges' unpopular decisions.96 Also, these
campaigns involved relatively high levels of spending on both sides, which
shows that retention elections do not necessarily remove judges' incentive to
cultivate contributors, lest they too fall victim to a well-financed effort to re-
move them from the bench.
87
However, in addition to the abolition of contested elections, a host of
other reforms of the judicial election process have been proposed that are aimed
at preserving the impartiality of the judiciary and its reputation for fairness and
integrity. The following is a discussion of the critical problems that observers
have identified with respect to judicial elections, and some of the reforms that
have been proposed in recent years to deal with them.
83 Id.
84 See Beth M. Henschen et al., Judicial Nominating Commissioners: A National Profile, 73
JUDICATURE 328, 331-32 (1990); Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific
Literature, 106 DICK. L. REV. 729, 732-35 (2002).
85 See Reddick, supra note 84, at 730, 732-34.
86 For accounts of successful campaigns to remove judges, see Traciel V. Reid, The Politiciza-
lion of Judicial Retention Elections: The Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, in RESEARCH ON
JUDICIAL SELECTION 1999 45-72 (American Judicature Society 1999); Robert S. Thompson, Judi-
cial Retention Elections and Judicial Method. A Retrospective on the California Retention Elec-
tion of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2007 (1988).
87 See, e.g., Reid, supra note 86, at 47-68. In this article, Reid describes the well-financed
efforts to remove Justice David Lanphier in Nebraska and Justice Penny White in Tennessee in
1996. Id.
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B. Problematic Campaign Speech or Materials
Many of those who scrutinize judicial elections are concerned about the
tenor of judicial campaigns, 88 specifically about the tendency of some candi-
dates to make statements about themselves or their opponents that are mislead-
ing, or that generally lower public confidence in the fairness and honesty of the
judiciary as a whole. 89 Some of the proposed solutions to this problem are as
follows:
1. Voluntary Campaign Speech Restrictions
Some local bar associations and state judicial conduct advisory boards
have promulgated guidelines to help judicial candidates raise the quality of the
dialogue in judicial campaigns. 90 Some of these organizations encourage candi-
dates to abide by the guidelines by offering the candidates rewards for compli-
ance, such as endorsements or free advertising in their publications. 9 1 Still,
these restrictions are voluntary, and many candidates may see it as being in their
interest not to abide by them, in an effort to differentiate themselves from their
opponents in the eyes of the public.
2. Campaign Monitoring Committees
These committees, the composition of which varies, can be composed of
citizens, lawyers, or, in some states, judges who observe and, in a sense, "refe-
ree" the conduct of judicial campaigns. 9 2  Generally, the activities of these
committees include educating candidates about the ethics rules governing their
conduct while running for office, responding to requests from the candidates for
advice about the appropriateness of campaign activities, receiving and investi-
gating complaints from candidates or the public about unethical conduct by can-
didates, and lobbying candidates and others involved in the campaign (e.g., po-
litical parties, advocacy groups, etc.) to discourage inappropriate conduct.
93
Most of these committees are unofficial, but some committees are quasi-official,
in that they are appointed by the state's highest court, and some are official, in
88 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 21-28, 34-35 (2003); Kathy
Barks Hoffman, Bitter Supreme Court Races Raise Questions, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 11,
2000.
89 See MATHIAS, supra note 15, at 31-32.
90 See id. at 34.
91 See id. at 34-35.
92 See Barbara Reed & Roy A. Schotland, Judicial Campaign Conduct Committees, 35 IND. L.
REv. 781, 785-88 (2001).
93 See id.
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that they receive government funding. 94 The effectiveness of unofficial and
quasi-official campaign monitoring committees is somewhat limited by the fact
that they have no power to sanction candidates or other participants in the cam-
paign except by publicly criticizing what the committee believes to be inappro-
priate campaign conduct, or by referring their conduct to a state's judicial disci-
plinary body. Furthermore, the powers of official committees are limited be-
cause they are constitutionally required to give candidates who are accused of
misconduct an opportunity to defend themselves, which can significantly delay
the process of taking action against them.
96
3. Fair Reporting Compacts
Fair reporting compacts are agreements between the major television
and print media outlets in a given area to shape coverage of judicial campaigns
so as not to sensationalize or distort the candidates' records, their backgrounds,
or the issues in the campaign. 97 Agreements such as these, which could be bro-
kered by third parties, might contain provisions enjoining the parties to the
compact to report incumbents' past decisions in context, to refrain from attack-
ing candidates who refuse to discuss their political views, and to comment fairly
and responsibly on the rhetoric during the campaign. 98 Such a compact was
tried once in Colorado in the early 1980's, but it was only a partial success since
only some of the major media outlets in the state agreed to it. 99
C. Problematic Campaign Financing
The following are some of the solutions that have been proposed to deal
with the harmful effects of campaign contributions on judicial independence and
impartiality:
1. Voluntary Campaign Spending and Contribution Limits
Although legislatively capping spending in political campaigns is un-
constitutional, voluntary spending limits have been proposed as a means to
94 See id at 785-88.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 790.
97 See, e.g., MATHIAS, supra note 15, at 37.
98 See id
99 See id. at 37-38.
1 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution
and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 133, 139-41 (1998).
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reduce judicial candidates' dependence on contributions. °10  This was tried at
least once, in a campaign in Rochester, New York, in 1982.102 The candidates
who participated reported that they were satisfied with the outcome,10 3 but this
experiment has not been replicated.
However, voluntary spending limits do not hold much promise as a so-
lution to the problems created by judicial campaign contributions because can-
didates who have adequate sources of funding have little incentive to either
agree to or maintain voluntary spending limits. Furthermore, there is no evi-
dence that the public will punish candidates who reject such agreements. For
example, in the Rochester, New York campaign, the only candidate in the race
who did not agree to limit his spending enjoyed a strong lead in the polls and
won handily.
104
2. Public Financing
Although several states disseminate information about judicial candi-
dates through state funded sources, 10 5 at present only two states, North Carolina
and Wisconsin, provide direct cash payments to candidates in some judicial
races.10 6 In North Carolina, funding is provided for supreme court and court of
appeals races, 10 7 while in Wisconsin, funding is only provided for supreme court
candidates. 10 8 In North Carolina, which has partisan judicial elections, qualifi-
cation for the funding begins in the primary.l°9 Candidates for the North Caro-
10 See MATHIAS, supra note 15, at 45.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 For example, Alaska, California, Oregon and Washington publish information about some
or all judicial candidates in the state and make this information available to voters free of charge.
See MATHIAS, supra note 15, at 18-19.
106 See Michael W. Bowers, Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns: Practices and Prospects,
4 NEv. L. J. 107, 116 (2003). Texas and Utah give public funding to the parties, but the parties
usually give very little of that money to judicial candidates. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly
Financed Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1476 n.20 (2001).
107 See Bowers, supra note 106, at 116.
108 See Geyh, supra note 106, at 1476.
109 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.64 (2004). The amount of this funding is to be updated
every two years by the state board of elections according to section 163-278.65(b). Id. § 163-
278.65(b). According to section 163.278.64(d)(1), the law permits a candidate who wishes to
accept public funds to raise up to $10,000 before filing a "declaration of intent" to participate in
the public funding program. Id. § 163-278.64(d)(1). Once the declaration of intent is filed, the
candidate may not accept contributions exceeding the maximum amount permitted in the pre-
general election period. See id § 163-278.64(b).
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lina Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals must meet certain fundraising
thresholds in order to be eligible to receive public funding in the general elec-
tion.110 In both cases, the money must be raised from at least 350 individuals
who contribute no more than $500 each.111 Once they reach the general elec-
tion, candidates who accept public funding may only spend the publicly pro-
vided funds and whatever funds remain from the primary campaign. 112 Candi-
dates who choose not to accept public funds may raise and spend as much as
they like, but the law lowers individual contribution limits for opt-out candidates
for the supreme court and the court of appeals to $1000, from $4,000, which is
the limit for candidates for other offices, and limits contributions from close
family members to $2,000.113 Furthermore, if funds raised in opposition to a
publicly funded candidate (i.e., funds raised by candidates or groups supporting
candidates opposing the publicly funded candidate) exceed the legally estab-
lished triggering amount, the publicly funded candidate can receive additional
"rescue" funds from the state. The amount of rescue funds available to each
participating candidate is equal to the level of triggering contributions for the
type of election in question, whether it is a primary or a general election. 115 The
state draws funding for the campaigns from a number of voluntary sources, in-
cluding a three-dollar voluntary state tax donation, and contributions from
members of the state bar when they renew their licenses. 116
In Wisconsin, which has non-partisan elections, funding for state su-
preme court campaigns comes from the Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund. 117
The fund is maintained in part by a voluntary one-dollar tax donation by those
110 See id.
I See id. During the qualifying period, a candidate seeking to qualify for public funds may
contribute up to $1000 to his/her campaign. See id § 163-278.64(d)(4). Also, the members of
his/her immediate family, plus his/her siblings and parents are also allowed to contribute up to
$1,000 each to the candidate's campaign. See id.
112 See id. § 163-278.64(d)(3).
113 See id. § 163-278.13(e2)(1)-(3).
114 See id. § 163-278.67(a). The triggering amounts for rescue funds are established by section
163-278.62(18). Id. § 163-278.62(18). According to section 163-278.62(18), the triggering level
for rescue funds in primary elections equals the maximum qualifying contributions for participat-
ing candidates. Id. In contested general elections, the triggering amount equals the base level of
funding available under section 163-278.65(b)(4). Id. In general elections for the court of ap-
peals, the triggering amount is 125 times the filing fee established by section 163-107, while the
triggering amount for contested general elections for the supreme court is 175 times the filing fee
established by section 163-107. See id. § 163-278.65(b)(4).
15 See id. § 163-278.67(b)-(c).
116 See id. § 163-278.63(b)(1)-(6).
17 See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 11.50 (West 2004).
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who file Wisconsin tax returns. 118 Eight percent of the fund is reserved for state
supreme court candidates in years when there is a supreme court race on the
ballot, and this amount is divided equally between all candidates who apply for
and are eligible to receive the funds.119 In order to receive public funds, there
must be at least two candidates for the supreme court seat in question (i.e., a
candidate running unopposed is not eligible for funding). 12  Also, a candidate
must raise a periodically adjusted qualifying amount in contributions of $100 or
less between the first of July preceding the spring election and the spring non-
partisan primary. 121 Candidates who accept public funds may not exceed an
established spending limit, 122 unless they withdraw from the public funding
scheme, 123 or are opposed by candidates who do not agree to limit their spend-
ing.124
Public funding of judicial campaigns also seems to hold little promise of
reducing the threat that contributions pose to judicial independence and imparti-
ality, mostly because candidates still must raise money to be eligible for the
public funds. Also, public funding plans that rely on voluntary contributions by
taxpayers are at the mercy of the public's desire to fund the program. The lower
the amount of funding that is available, the less incentive candidates have to
participate in the program. For example, taxpayer participation in the Wiscon-
sin program fell from twenty percent in 1979 to approximately nine percent in
1998,125 and the last time all of the candidates in a Wisconsin supreme court
election were fully funded was in 1989.126 Not surprisingly, the percentage of
candidates participating in the public funding plan has also diminished from
fifty-five percent in 1986 to fourteen percent in 2000.127 Furthermore, the nine
candidates who participated in the program between 1989 and 1997 received, on
118 See id. § 71.10(3)(a).
119 See id. § 11.50(3)(a)(2).
120 See id. § 1 1.50(2)(b)(3).
121 See id. § 11.50(2)(b)(5). Subject to the strictures set forth in section 11.50(2)(b)(5), the
minimum qualifying amount for races for the Wisconsin Supreme Court is equal to 5% of the
disbursement limit established by section 11.3 l(1)(de) which is adjusted periodically according to
the method explained in section 11.31(9)(b). See id. § 11.50(2)(b)(5).
122 See id. § 11.31(2).
123 See id. § I1.50(2)(h).
124 See id § 11.50(2)(i).
125 See More Supporting Publicly Financed Elections in State, CAP. TIMES (Madison), Aug. 14,
1999, at 2A.
126 See Geyh, supra note 106, at 1477.
127 See id.
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average, only $45,354.128 North Carolina's plan for publicly financing judicial
races is subject to the same problems as the Wisconsin system, since it too is
funded by taxpayers who indicate their willingness to donate a portion of their
taxes to fund the election scheme. 
129
Another reason public funding is not a viable solution to the problems
posed by contributions is that such plans impose spending limits on candidates
when none are imposed on the private interest groups that might oppose them.
The possibility of an opposition campaign being waged against a candidate if
they accept public funds is yet another reason for judicial candidates not to ac-
cept the funding
3. Blind Trust Funds
A blind trust fund plan requires an organization unaffiliated with any of
the candidates or political parties to collect contributions and distribute the fund
to the candidates so that the candidates do not know the identity of the individu-
als and organizations that contribute money to their campaigns. 13  The bar in
Dade County, Florida, implemented one such plan for the 1972 election.
131
Under that plan, attorneys who wished to contribute gave money to the bar asso-
ciation, which then distributed the money to the candidates on a pro rata basis
according to how the bar association rated their fitness for office. However,
the plan was discontinued after 1974 when the state declared that the scheme
violated state campaign finance laws and when other questions arose about the
trust mechanism. 133 In 1979, the Michigan legislature considered a plan to cre-
ate a state body that would accept contributions from attorneys and distribute
them to the candidates of their choice without the candidates knowing the iden-
tity of the contributor.' 34 In order to participate, the contributors had to promise
to give only through the committee, and candidates had to forgo any other con-
tributions from attorneys. 35 The bill was never enacted into law.'
36
Although blind trust funds might look appealing at first glance because
they prevent candidates from knowing to whom they are indebted, and because
128 See id.
129 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.63(b)(1)-(6) (2004).
130 See MATHIAS, supra note 15, at 50-5 1.
131 See id. at 50.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See id.
136 See id.
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they do not rely on public funds, their effectiveness as a solution is questionable
for a number of reasons. The first reason for this is because there is no way to
reliably prevent contributors from communicating their support to candidates.
The second reason is that any state law mandating participation in a trust fund
would be of dubious constitutionality, and if participation in a trust fund remains
voluntary, there is little incentive for contributors to agree to it since they would
then lose one of the primary benefits of the contribution (i.e., the candidate's
gratitude for their support).
4. Strengthening Disqualification Rules
Most state ethics codes call for judges to recuse themselves in cases
where their impartiality may be compromised. 3 7 In the past, these provisions
have not been interpreted as requiring judges to refuse to hear cases in which
contributors to their campaigns are involved. 138 These ethics rules could be
amended or reinterpreted to require judges to recuse themselves from cases in
which a party, amicus, or attorney has contributed a "substantial" amount to thejudg's .139
judge's campaign. Exactly what amount would constitute a "substantial"
amount would vary from one jurisdiction to another.140
Strengthening disqualification rules has some appeal as a solution to the
problem of contributors wielding undue influence on judges because contribu-
tors would be prevented from reaping any direct benefits from their contribu-
tions. However, this reform would only work if the rule barred all contributors,
not only those who contributed substantial amounts, because law firms and other
large concerns can circumvent rules disqualifying large contributors by "bun-
dling" their contributions to a candidate. Bundling occurs when many individu-
als affiliated with an organization give to a candidate in order to thwart rules
limiting the amount that the organization can give to the candidate under its own
name. This practice is perfectly legal under current campaign finance laws,
and would certainly continue under a regime of stronger disqualification rules.
However there are other factors that make this solution problematic.
Completely prohibiting judges from hearing cases involving contributors might
present problems in locales that are served by only a few judges, since litigants
137 See, e.g., MATHIAS, supra note 15, at 52.
138 See, e.g., Alfini & Brooks, supra note 39, at 714 (claiming that at the time the article was
published, no court or ethics committee had ruled that contributing to a judge's campaign was, by
itself, enough to require a judge's recusal when a contributor appeared before them).
139 See MATHIAS, supra note 15, at 52.
140 See id.
141 See Frontline, So You Want to Buy a President?, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front
line/president/guide/glossary.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
[Vol. 107
23
McLeod: If At First You Don't Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of Judicial
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORMEFFORTS
who wished to contribute might be left with few judges to hear their cases.142
Such a prohibition might also make it very difficult for judicial candidates to get
adequate financial support to run any sort of meaningful campaign. 14 3 Further-
more, prohibiting judges from hearing cases involving contributors could also
have the effect of giving excessive influence to those from outside of the state or
locality where the candidate is running. This is because outside contributors
have less chance of ever having a matter before the judges running for election,
which would mean that non-local contributors would have less to fear by giving
to a candidate.1
44
5. Prohibiting Contributions from Certain Sources
Another solution to the problems arising from campaign contributions is
to bar contributions from donors whose money will cast doubt on the impartial-
ity of the winning candidate. For example, the Illinois Bar Association once
proposed that attorneys licensed to practice in the state of Illinois be prohibited
from contributing to Illinois judicial candidates.14 5 Ohio, in a less extreme ex-
ample, has banned judicial candidates from accepting contributions from court
employees, court appointees, or from anyone else that judges personally direct
in the course of their official duties. 146 The problem with this particular pro-
posal, however, is that it does nothing to prevent other interests from influencing
the judicial process through their contributions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The central reason for the ineffectiveness of all of these reforms is that
they do not remedy the root cause of the threat that elections pose to judicial
impartiality, which is the perverse incentive that reselection, be it legislative
reselection, contested elections, or retention elections, creates in the judicial
decision making process. Put simply, most judges want to keep their jobs, and
whenever keeping their jobs depends on what others think of their decisions,
judges have an incentive to give excessive weight to these other opinions when
making their decisions, whether it is the opinions of contributors, voters, politi-
cal allies, or members of the state legislature. This is the very reason why the
A.B.A.'s Commission on the Twenty-First Century Judiciary ("the Commis-
sion") recommended that states do away with all forms of judicial reselection in
142 See MATHIAS, supra note 15, at 53.
143 See id
'4 See id.
145 See Illinois Bar Ass'n, The Bar, the Bench and Professionalism in Illinois: Proud Tradi-
tions, Tough New Problems, Current Choices, 76 ILL. B.J. 441, 447 (Apr. 1988).
14 See OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(C)(1) (West 2004).
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favor of having judges serve for life, until a certain age, or for a single lengthy
• . 147
term (fifteen years) without the possibility of reselection. On the question of
initial selection to the bench, the Commission recommended that states use the
merit selection practice currently in use in many states, under which the gover-
nor appoints judges from among a list of candidates prepared by a nominating
committee or other body that is credible, neutral, non-partisan, and diverse.
When the Commission recommended the use of nominating commissions in the
process of selecting candidates for the bench, it specifically noted that initial
selection through elections was a less favored option because it felt that elec-
tions had a tendency to compromise the judiciary's impartial image. 149
The Commission's suggestion is a sensible alternative for states that
currently employ judicial elections (or other forms of re-selection) for a number
of reasons. First, it eliminates the damage that elections and other forms of rese-
lection do to the impartiality of the judiciary, and to the public's belief in that
impartiality, by ensuring that judges do not have to face any sort of reselection
in order to keep their jobs, and have any need to raise money to campaign to
keep their jobs. Second, if states chose to move to a system in which judges
were allowed to serve only a single, lengthy term on the bench, such a change
would allow for the regular cycling of new people with new ideas into the judi-
ciary. In a sense, this aspect of the proposal might also prove more effective
than elections at keeping the judiciary in tune with community mores, because it
mandates the constant infusion of new judges with new perspectives into the
institution, whereas elective systems allow the same judges to serve on the
bench for decades.
Although doing away with elections might be the proper step to take in
order to improve the quality and the perception of the American state judiciary,
advocates of reform should have no illusions about the ease of accomplishing
their task. For one thing, there are formidable legal obstacles to be overcome.
In almost all states, ending judicial elections would require a constitutional
amendment, which in many states requires a referendum and the approval of
147 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 67-73 (2003), available at http://www.manningproductions.com
/ABA263/finalreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2004). The Commission was careful to note, how-
ever, their belief that judges should still be subject to removal for misconduct. See id. at 70.
148 See id. One way of achieving the A.B.A. Commission's goal of keeping judicial selection
commissions focused on evaluating the professional qualifications of candidates, and away from
political considerations, might be to ensure that all commissions are balanced with regard to party
composition. A survey of judicial nominating commission members indicated that political con-
siderations figured less prominently in the decisions of commissioners who served on a board that
had an equal number of Republicans and Democrats, than in the decisions of commissioners who
did not serve on politically balanced boards. See ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFIN, THE KEY TO
JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 75-77 (1974).
149 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 147, at 70-71.
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super majorities of both houses of the legislature. 15  Securing that degree of
consensus on an issue as controversial as who chooses the state's judges and
how long judges should serve would certainly be difficult. Also, it undoubtedly
would not be easy to convince the public that taking away their right to choose
their judges or to hold them accountable for their decisions would be in their
best interests, despite the fact that the public appears to be concerned about the
negative effects of campaign contributions and excessive partisanship in judicial
campaigns.
The task of those campaigning for reform will not be made any easier
by the fact that many interests, including business groups, labor unions, and
attorneys might lobby hard against the change, since it would reduce their abil-
ity to influence the judiciary through campaign contributions and independent
involvement in judicial campaigns.
The difficulty of achieving such a fundamental change in the judicial se-
lection process is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that no state that at one
time elected its judiciary has completely done away with elections since Vir-
ginia did so in 1869.151 Such reform, however, is the only way to remove the
threat that judicial elections pose to judicial independence and impartiality.
Although the road to reform may be long and difficult, with the integrity of our
justice system at stake, it is a road worth traveling.
150 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 2; MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. XV, § 273(2)
(1992); OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. XVI(1) (1974).
151 See Alex B. Long, An Historical Perspective on Judicial Selection Methods in Virginia and
West Virginia, 18 J.L. & POL. 691, 751 (2002).
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